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Abstract
The problem of rent-seeking in China‘s state-owned enterprises has worsened
since the rapid increase in infrastructure investment, such as telecom and railway.
State-owned enterprise reform in China has given licensing power to officials and
executives without sufficient checks and balances. The Chinese government plans to
introduce corporate governance structures and encourage private investment for the
previously state-dominated industries, such as the railway industry, in the next decade.
Yet these formalities cannot eradicate the political problem of corruption. This thesis
will examine rent-seeking through the case studies of China Mobile‘s former deputy
general manager and Communist Party secretary Zhang Chunjiang‘s patronage
network in the value-added service industry and the Ministry of Railway‘s ex-Minister
Liu Zhijun‘s patronage networks in the high speed railway project. Both central agents
committed collective rent-seeking against the will of the principal through their
subsidiaries.
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I.

Introduction
―Changing the system,‖ or gaizhi, is one of China‘s main policy initiatives that

has targeted restructuring state-owned enterprises since Reform and Opening.1 Yet
gaizhi does not equate to privatization and has created many public-private hybrids,
such as joint ventures between state-owned and privately-owned businesses.2 The
vast majority of the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) that have issued shares on
domestic and oversea stock exchanges are classified as non-state firms, but they are
still tightly controlled by the state.3 Due to the lack of checks and balances such as
independent accounting and legal institutions, profits from gaizhi in China financed
rising corruption among Chinese officials and executives. Rent-seekers could reap
more profits from the growing flow of value than before gaizhi. In 2011, The People's
Bank of China made public a confidential study stating that 800 billion yuan had been
siphoned overseas by thousands of government officials and state-owned companies
from the mid-1990s to 2008. Furthermore, the state monopolizes imports of foreign
technology for high speed rail and other construction projects. Vague intellectual
property rights and closed bidding allowed people with administrative power to
rent-seek through contracts. Yet corruption can inflate economic growth for building
more infrastructure projects, since the Party allocates trillions of dollars in fixed

1

The Economist. "Government and business in China: Privatisation with Chinese characteristics." The Economist
- World News, Politics, Economics, Business & Finance. http://www.economist.com/node/21528264 (accessed
November 27, 2012).
―Between 1995 and 2001, the number of state-owned and state-controlled enterprises fell by nearly two-thirds,
from 1.2 million to 468,000, and the proportion of urban workers employed in the state sector fell by nearly half,
from 59 percent to 32 percent.‖
2
Ibid.
3
Huang, Yasheng. Capitalism with Chinese characteristics: entrepreneurship and the state. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2008. 17.

2

investment through state banks in the form of cheap loans. The books are opaque and
subject to manipulation when the state assesses SOE-generated growth. 4 Chinese
officials thus can receive both kickbacks from SOE investments and the credit for
economic growth generate by such investments.5
Under Chairman Jiang Zemin and Premier Zhu Rongji, the 1990s saw a hiatus
in SOE reform. Previous literature on corruption exposes tensions between gaizhi
efforts and government control. Hon Chan argues that the major SOE reforms in
1998 have presented the Party with a difficult trade-off between maintaining political
primacy and achieving economic modernization. The nomenklatura or ruling elite
encapsulates the contradictory desires of the party-state—continuing political control
despite efforts for marketization.6 Guo Yong and Hu Angang further identify Chinese
corruption in this era as: administrative monopoly, a unique form that has emerged in
the gradual economic reform process in China. They examine in particular the extent
of economic loss and the loss of rents in an industrial monopoly.7 The present thesis is
in part an extension of this work.
Ting Gong supplements the Principal-Agent model of corruption in China in his
research. He argues that there are multiple agents, SOE officials and executives, all
willing to collude to pursue their individual interests while betraying the government,

4

Woo, Wing Thye. "The Macroeconomic Consequences of China's Partially-Reformed Economy." China
Perspectives. chinaperspectives.revues.org/686 (accessed December 2, 2012).
5
Pei, Minxin. "Explaining China's Corruption Paradox." Business News & Financial News - The Wall Street
Journal. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303918204577446021540060982.html (accessed
November 25, 2012).
6
Chan, Hon S.. "Cadre Personnel Management in China: The Nomenklatura System, 1990-1998." The China
Quarterly 179 (2004): 703-734.
7
Guo, Yong, and Angang Hu. "Administrative Monopoly in Economy Transition In China_Publications_China
Institute for Reform and Development (CIRD)." China Institute for Reform and Development(CIRD).
http://www.chinareform.org/publications/reports/200206/t20020618_111297.htm (accessed November 28, 2012).

3

their principal. They may commit collective corruption even while rent-seeking for
personal benefits. Corruption would no longer be an isolated action, but a network of
interactions and exchanges among corrupt individuals.8 He gives the example of the
Minjiang Engineering Bureau of Fujian Province corruption case that implicated 70
percent of its bureau-level officials, including the bureau director and the Party chief.
Each of them accepted bribes of at least hundreds of thousands yuan. Between 2001
and 2005, there were 14 major corruption cases in the financial sector, with up to US
$1 billion of embezzled funds.9 Collective corruption cases involve bigger sums of
money than individual corruption. Ting Gong identifies a vicious circle: the
involvement of more people requires bigger sums to be divided; big sums make it
necessary to involve more people. As the sum of money increases, the risk of being
caught increases, and the need for protection grows. Collective corruption thus
involves the support and protection of officials ―above.‖ A corrupt official can create
a safety network against detection by engaging superiors or superiors' superiors in
collaboration. 10 Ting Gong also suggests that the participants in collective
corruption may form temporary collaborative relationships for specific ventures only.
Once a venture is completed, the partnership between rent-seekers may dissolve. Or
a new partnership may form once another venture attracts government investment.11

8

Gong, Ting. "Dangerous collusion: corruption as a collective venture in contemporary China." Communist and
Post-Communist Studies 35, no. 1 (2002): 85-103.
9
Wen, Yuanhua, 2006, ―Three topics on anti-corruption in the banking business.‖ Caijing Magazine.
http://magazine.caijing.com.cn/2005-12-26/110065511.html (accessed November 24, 2012).
10
Gong, Ting. "Dangerous collusion: corruption as a collective venture in contemporary China." Communist and
Post-Communist Studies 35, no. 1 (2002): 85-103. For example, if the bribed individual shares his gifts, either
material or monetary, with his boss, thereby making the latter a bribe taker as well, the chance for him to be caught
may diminish since the boss, compelled by the need for self-protection, would make an effort to protect him.
11
Ibid.
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This collusion, long-term as well as venture-based, occurs often in the context of
SOEs, as further detailed in Chapter II.
The recent high-profile corruption cases of Minister of Railways Liu Zhijun and
deputy vice chairman of China Mobile Zhang Chunjiang can help us understand
these collaborative relationships. Case studies in this thesis confirm Ting Gong‘s
theories on corrupt individuals‘ need for protection as well as the existence of
temporary relationships in the form of joint ventures. Yet a case study of the railway
industry and one of its key figures, businesswoman Ding Shumiao, also shows that
while the ventures names may change (to avoid public exposure of patronage), the
benefactor of the venture can remain the same. When the public scrutinizes a current
venture, rent-seekers can still embezzle money by changing the names of ventures.
Economists Wu Jinglian and Huang Shaoqing argue that reform measures have
given SOE managers two ways to utilize control rights and rent-seek: first, to
transfer benefits out of the national treasury to into their own control or, second, to
funnel money through closely-connected, authorized subsidiaries.12 The principal,
the Party, authorizes the agent, a manager, to run an SOE. The rent-seeking manager
creates a subsidiary and delegates full authority to manage the subsidiary and its
assets to an associate, who may create another subsidiary. This hierarchy of
subsidiaries, known as the ―multi-tier legal person system,‖ is also mentioned by

12

Wu, Jinglian, and Shaoqing Huang. "Innovation or Rent-seeking: The Entrepreneurial Behavior during China's
Economic Transformation." China & World Economy 16 (2008): 64–81.
The profits would flow into their own small cashboxes (xiaojinku) while the losses would be left for the state to
bear. For example, in recent years, state owned securities and futures companies have accumulated billions of
non-performing assets for which the government will have to ―pay the bill.‖

5

Ting Gong‘s research of layers of supervisors.13 In such structures, the principal, has
no effective control over collusion between agents, leading to rent-seeking and loss
of public assets.14 Lu Xiaobo uses the concept of organizational corruption to explain
department-based rent-seeking conducted in the name of an official unit equipped
with legitimate discretion.15 This thesis will focus on two main departments as case
studies of unit-based rent-seeking. This thesis will build on Wu Jinglian and Huang
Shaoqing‘s model of agent-subsidiary relationships and Lu‘s concept of
―department-based‖ rent-seeking.
This thesis adds a new dimension to the understanding of corruption by
suggesting that collusive rent-seeking centers around an individual that holds
centralized power in the state-owned enterprise (SOE). The central figure of the SOE,
authorized as an agent of the Party, can establish complicit subsidiaries for the
purposes of collective corruption. Even though officials within the department commit
―organizational corruption,‖ they rely on their ties with that specific person. The
central agent then extends the administrative power to his network of family and
friends. This thesis will focus on two recent cases of corruption in the
telecommunications and railway industries to show the extent of patronage networks
in SOEs. I will discuss examples of networks comprising ex-officials and their
subsidiaries in China Mobile Group and the Ministry of Railway (MOR). Zhang

13

Ibid. These tiers could amount to ten tiers or more.
Ibid.
15
Lu, Xiaobo. "Booty Socialism, Bureau-Preneurs, and the State in Transition: Organizational Corruption in
China." Comparative Politics 32, no. 3 (2000): 273-294.
14
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Chunjiang networks in the telecom industry in chapter IV, and the Liu Zhijun, Zhang
Shuguang and Ding Shumiao networks in the railway industry in chapter V.16
China Mobile Group and the MOR are comparable because the state still
controls economic activities of both and uses them to benefit ruling elites. While the
MOR, China Mobile and other telecom firms have sold minority stakes to private
investors, they operate more or less like government ministries.17 Huang argues that
although these reform measures copy the superficial forms of a capitalistic market
economy, none of them has anything to do with changing the owners of the firms.
Rather than transferring corporate control from state to private investors, reform was
directed at ensuring the state‘s holdings of the SOEs.18 While some economists might
have assumed that legal-person shareholding implies that China has a keiretsu
arrangement similar to that in Japan where firms own each other‘s stocks, they are not
as privately-owned in China‘s case. Huang Yasheng clarifies that the difference with
Japan is that ―in China much of the legal-person share capital originates in the state
sector, via SOEs establishing or holding significant equity stakes in other firms. These
firms then become affiliates or subsidiaries of the SOEs,‖ and thus are still SOEs by
account of control.19 The history of telecom reform in chapter III will show that the
"corporatization" of the state-owned telecom assets and the transition from a
16

One hindrance to this study is limited the number of case studies available. Finances of unlisted state-owned
enterprises‘ assets are not disclosed. One can read conjectures about high-level corruption from sources such as
Boxun News and Mingjing News, which are not always reliable. However, researchers and analysts can scrutinize
patronage connections when corruption cases emerge. When the Party decides to crack down on a faction, official,
or executive, it indicates the loss of political protection. The crackdown serves as a ―pass‖ for serious Chinese
media to conduct investigations and publish findings of that faction.
17
The Economist. "Government and business in China: Privatisation with Chinese characteristics." The Economist
- World News, Politics, Economics, Business & Finance. http://www.economist.com/node/21528264 (accessed
November 27, 2012).
18
Huang, Yasheng. Capitalism with Chinese characteristics: entrepreneurship and the state. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2008.
19
Ibid. 16.

7

monopoly (a single SOE) to an oligopoly (several SOEs) has not altered the nature of
state control.
By comparing the two cases in chapter VI, this thesis observes that partial
privatization from gaizhi cannot reduce and may exacerbate the presence of
rent-seeking in SOEs. Without public disclosure of accounts, external auditing, better
anti-monopoly laws, and independent media, gradual privatization will only create
more rent-seeking opportunities for the well-connected people. In my case studies,
corruption campaigns are informed by people who covet the powerful spots within
industries. Informers are motivated out of self-interest rather than creating a better
system. The timing of Zhang Chunjiang and Liu Zhijun‘s downfall are also part of the
18th Party Congress‘s power reshuffle. While much of the explanations for power
alignments are speculative, people expect dramatic changes in high leadership before
Party congresses. Although much critical political action occurs behind closed doors,
the calls for anti-corruption reforms from State Council planning commissions are
mere formality. Economic reforms alone thus cannot reduce the ruling elites' ability to
allocate rents to critical economic sectors. Reform measures taken to improve the
efficiency of these sectors are compromised by elite interest.20

20

Pei, Minxin. China's trapped transition: the limits of developmental autocracy. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 2006. 96.

8

II.

The Problem of Corruption in State-Owned Enterprises
SOEs have generated much criticism as an inefficient model. About 40 percent of

SOEs are still operating at a loss, and there's no evidence that SOEs are good at
innovation or efficiency. 21 Relative to the private sector, SOEs consume a large
proportion of capital, raw materials and intermediate inputs to produce relatively
small shares of gross output and value added.22 SOEs that monopolize sectors are
critiqued for paralyzing China‘s technological innovation despite its rich pool of
scientific talent.23 SOEs also fail to profit when adjusted for the many subsidies and
benefits received from government policies, such as cheap loans. While private
enterprises encountered difficulties in accessing bank loans, SOEs received most
bank loans. The tax rate for SOEs stands at 10 percent, while private companies get a
tax rate of 24 percent.24 Many local governments even encouraged local SOEs to
dodge their repayment obligations to state-owned commercial banks through various
kinds of tricks, such as declaring bankruptcy.25 The Unirule Institute of Economics,
a Chinese think tank, released a study in 2011 of the central SOEs as well as their large
provincial and municipal subdivisions. SOEs reported profits of RMB 5.8 trillion (US
$920 billion) from 2001 to 2009. After accounting for RMB 7.5 trillion (US $1.19

21

Wang, Xiaotian, and Jia Chen. "State-owned assets 'need to be further capitalized'|Business|chinadaily.com.cn."
China Daily US Edition. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2012-11/29/content_15969814.htm (accessed
November 29, 2012).
22
World Bank. "China 2030: Building a Modern, Harmonious, and Creative High-Income Society." World Bank
Group. http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/2012/02/27/china-2030-executive-summary (accessed November 29,
2012).
23
McGregor, James. No Ancient Wisdom, No Followers: The Challenges of Chinese Authoritarian Capitalism.
Perseus Books Group. 2012. Kindle Edition. Kindle Locations 1837-1840.
24
Wang, Xiaotian, and Jia Chen. "State-owned assets 'need to be further capitalized'|Business|chinadaily.com.cn."
China Daily US Edition. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2012-11/29/content_15969814.htm (accessed
November 29, 2012).
25
Wu, Jinglian, and Shaoqing Huang. " Innovation or Rent-seeking: The Entrepreneurial Behavior during China's
Economic Transformation." China & World Economy 16 (2008): 64–81.
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trillion) in subsidies and costs, Unirule showed that SOEs‘ real average return on
equity in those years was negative 6.29 percent.26

The Chinese Communist Party supported state-owned firms in old priority sectors
while encouraging the development of private enterprises under a trial-by-error
exploration scheme in the 1990s.27 Since the last SOE reform in 2003, many large
state enterprises have been ―corporatized.‖ Some of the biggest, including those
directly monitored by the central government, are now listed on stock exchanges with
improved governance structure, managerial professionalism, and profitability. But the
profitability of state enterprises still remains well below non-state and pure private
firms, partly due to the rate of corruption.28 Partial reform or gaizhi has allowed the
politically connected groups to double-dip by taking advantage of both the new
opportunities offered by the market and the rents provided by the old unreformed
state-planned system. These groups rely on their administrative power to create new
monopolies and barriers to trade, resulting in lower output, efficiency losses, and
fragmented markets.29

The Party leadership hoped that Chinese SOEs could compete globally with other
Fortune 500s. They believed that ―corporatizing‖ SOEs by selling small stakes to the
stock markets would not only raise money but also make them more competitive. The

26

McGregor, James. No Ancient Wisdom, No Followers: The Challenges of Chinese Authoritarian Capitalism.
Perseus Books Group. 2012. Kindle Edition. Kindle Locations 246-247.
27
World Bank. "China 2030: Building a Modern, Harmonious, and Creative High-Income Society." World Bank
Group. http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/2012/02/27/china-2030-executive-summary (accessed November 29,
2012).
28
Ibid.
29
Pei, Minxin. China's trapped transition: the limits of developmental autocracy. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 2006. 24.
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majority of the shares stayed under government ownership. Some SOEs ventured
outside mainland China. In 1997, China Mobile Group turbocharged the process with
a dual listing in New York and Hong Kong, raising US $4.2 billion.30 Yet corruption is
a key obstacle limiting the efficiency and innovation of these SOEs down.
In May 2012, Party leaders revived a reform package known as the ―Thirty-Six
Clauses‖ that was buried in 2005. James McGregor suggests that the outlines could be
―the largest opening for the private economy since Deng Xiaoping launched reforms
in 1979.‖ 31 Included are ideas for allowing private investment in SOEs such as
electricity, telecommunications, railway, aviation and oil. October 24th 2012, the
Chinese Communist Party vowed to reform state-dominated industries and aid them in
market entry again. The government aims to push for large state-owned enterprises to
go public or list their main businesses if conditions allow.32 The Party plans to speed
up reforms for the railway industry so that companies in that sector can relinquish
their roles as supervisors and stakeholders.33 The Party plans to encourage companies
that are not fit to be listed to hasten restructuring, as well as introduce corporate
governance for companies solely held by the state.34 Guo Shuqing, the chairman of
the China Securities Regulatory Commission, even suggested the government to put
state-owned assets into the social security system.35

30

McGregor, James. No Ancient Wisdom, No Followers: The Challenges of Chinese Authoritarian Capitalism.
Perseus Books Group. 2012. Kindle Edition. Kindle Locations 418-422.
31
Ibid. Kindle Locations 371-381. These clauses are called ―三十六条‖ in Chinese.
32
Ibid. In April, the Ministry of Transport outlined private investment possibilities in transportation infrastructure,
services, and related emerging industries
33
Xinhua. "China Focus: China pledges further reforms for state-dominated sectors." People's Daily Online.
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90785/7990705.html (accessed November 24, 2012). Other industries include
postal services and salt.
34
Ibid.
35
Wang, Xiaotian, and Jia Chen. "State-owned assets 'need to be further capitalized'|Business|chinadaily.com.cn."
China Daily US Edition. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2012-11/29/content_15969814.htm? (accessed

11

The Ministry of Railway (MOR) plans to set up a railway development fund,
allowing for private capital to participate in investment through a quasi-stock platform
arrangement. Chinese officials believe that this forms a critical section for the
undergoing railway ―reform.‖ This move supposedly could help the government meet
its objective for increased railway investment and quadruple the length of high speed
railway by 2020.36 Yet without checks and balances, private funds could potentially
be channeled elsewhere and used as an off-budget spending source. The ministry is so
large that bureaucrats create fictional departments and run up expenses for them.37
Another example was when US $78 million that had been set aside to compensate
people whose homes had been demolished to make way for railroad tracks
disappeared.38
Support for stock listings originate decades earlier, proponents that include
China‘s then-leader Deng Xiaoping. He once famously encouraged for SOE stock
listing under a banner of ―Socialism,‖
―Are such things as securities and stocks good, do they cause danger, are they
things unique to capitalism, can socialism make use of them? It is permissible to
judge, but we must be resolute in having a try. If it proves right, then we put it into

November 29, 2012).
36
Zhang, Bin, Jian Tan, Feng Zhu, and Ye Yang. "Tiedaobu yunniang sheli tielu fazhan jijin." Jingji Cankao Wang.
http://www.jjckb.cn/2012-11/20/content_413221.htm (accessed November 21, 2012).
Zheng, Yangpeng. "NDRC approves 75b yuan rail projects." China Daily.
www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2012-11/27/content_15963231.htm (accessed November 28, 2012).
China's NDRC, approved infrastructure projects valued at 75 billion yuan ($12 billion), in an effort to stabilize
China's slowing economic growth. The projects include a city railway in Fuzhou, the capital of Fujian province, a
railway between Fuzhou and Pingtan, an island off the coast about 130 kilometers from Fuzhou, and the
2012-2019 city railway planning of Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang Uyghur autonomous region. China City
Railway Transportation Association said by 2015 total investment in China's city railways would amount to 1.2
trillion yuan and 4.3 times the current level of railway length.
37
Osnos, Evan. "How a High-Speed Rail Disaster Exposed China‘s Corruption : The New Yorker." The New
Yorker. http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2012/10/22/121022fa_fact_osnos#ixzz2DAnITtiy (accessed
November 24, 2012).
38
Ibid.
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practice for one or two years, if again it proves right, then we should open it; if it
proves wrong, we will correct it and close it.‖39
This attitude shows that the government retains control over the course of ―socialist‖
stock listings. While specific stock arrangements changed over time, the initial
rationale reveals the government‘s intention to control. Different forms of private
investment, such as public listing or development funds, have not and will not change
the fundamental power relations between the government and an SOE or the MOR
and a provincial railway branch.
A common misperception suggests that a significant portion of these SOE shares
are publicly traded. In reality, the state controls the majority of the shares. This is the
case with all the Fortune 500 Chinese SOEs. In my other example, China Mobile
Group, only 30 percent of it is publicly listed under the title of its sub-company China
Mobile Co.40 Even if a sub-company is publicly listed, the checks on corruption are
not strong. A typical I.P.O. process rarely uncovers the ultimate identity of
shareholders, who could hide behind investment vehicles by using unrecognizable
names.

41

Opaqueness offers opportunities for rent-seeking agent-subsidiary

relationships to form.

39

People's Daily Online. "Records of Comrade Deng Xiaoping's Shenzhen Tour (II)." People's Daily Online Home Page. http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200201/25/print20020125_89333.html (accessed November 25,
2012).
40
McGregor, James. No Ancient Wisdom, No Followers: The Challenges of Chinese Authoritarian Capitalism.
Perseus Books Group. 2012. Kindle Edition. Kindle Locations 1061- 1063.
The sub-company is titled China Mobile Co. (中国移动), while the main body, with government ownership, is
called China Mobile Group(中国移动通信集团).
41
Barboza, David. "Lobbying, a Windfall and a Leader‘s Family." The New York Times - Breaking News, World
News & Multimedia.
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/25/business/chinese-insurers-regulatory-win-benefits-a-leaders-family.html?pa
gewanted=all (accessed November 25, 2012).
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Calls for provincial or subdivision railway companies to act like market players
are also unrealistic. China's railway authorities have traditionally relied on centralized
management. ―Bureaus cannot provide complete transportation services, and they
have no means of directly acquiring revenue from the market,‖ Beijing Jiaotong
University Professor Rong Chao said. "They have no full command and control rights
on their operations, and cannot be called true companies.‖ 42 As long as the
government official maintains control over capital, human resources, and other
resources such as user rights, the subdivisions or SOEs will not function as market
players despite formalities of privatization.
The strategic importance of SOEs will become one major argument against future
reforms. The Chinese government justified state ownership despite dismal profit for
certain industries because they have strategic importance or have the features of ―a
natural monopoly.‖ 43 The government often cites strategic concerns for blocking
private or foreign capital investment. Contrary to the hopes of the World Trade
Organization, these industries in China increased in 2006, when then-Chairman Hu
Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao issued a directive titled ―Guiding Opinion on
Promoting the Adjustment of State-Owned Capital and the Reconstruction of
State-Owned Enterprises.‖ The document authorized that SOE dominance would be
suitable for ―major infrastructure and important mineral resources.‖44 The leading
SOEs in 2011 revenue are China Petroleum and Chemical Corp. (or Sinopec), earning

42

Gu, Yongqiang. "Another Sidetrack for China's Railway Reform." Caixin.
english.caixin.com/2011-10-08/100311671.html (accessed November 21, 2012).
43
McGregor, James. No Ancient Wisdom, No Followers: The Challenges of Chinese Authoritarian Capitalism.
Perseus Books Group. 2012. Kindle Edition. Kindle Location 56.
44
Ibid. Kindle Locations 451-462.
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US $273 billion, State Grid Corp. of China (US $226 billion), Industrial and
Commercial Bank of China (US $80 billion), China Mobile Group (US $76 billion),
and China Railway Group (US $69 billion).45 At the end of 2011, China had 117
central SOEs that held assets worth 28 trillion yuan, mainly operating in the energy,
telecommunications, transportation and defense industries.46 The monopoly of these
industries gives the government the control of resource, or else shocks to the sector
can threaten the regime's hold on power.47
More importantly, China‘s Communist Party also uses SOEs to provide good jobs
for its members. More than five million Party members hold executive positions in
state-owned or affiliated firms.48 Some heads of state-owned enterprise are Central
Committee members.49 While in America there are revolving doors between official
and corporate positions, China further eliminates the revolving door and created many
opportunities for administrative rent-seeking. Cheng Li argues that state monopoly is
the main cause of corruption.50 Hu Xingdong shares similar fears: ―Since the central
government announced limits to official expenditures on purchasing cars, a lot of
leading officials have in fact asked state-owned enterprises to buy cars for them …

45

Ibid. Kindle Locations 527-535.
Wang, Xiaotian, and Jia Chen. "State-owned assets 'need to be further capitalized'|Business|chinadaily.com.cn."
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The SOEs have become like private ATM machines for local government officials.‖51
Furthermore, the government‘s 2008 stimulus in reaction to the financial crisis also
overflowed unsupervised infrastructure SOEs with cash.
Another nexus for rent-seeking and resistance against control lies within the
administrative power granted to China‘s major national SOEs by government
ministries. Ministries or SOEs, depending on their relative administrative power, often
regulate and control many subsidiaries while also benefitting from these regulations.52
Literature shows that rent-seeking through abusing administrative power was the
main source of rampant corruption during China‘s transition.53 For example, by
2007, nearly half of all Chinese provinces had sent their chief of transportation to jail
for corruption.54 The widespread graft phenomenon caused by lack of an independent
regulator holds true for the railway industry. 80 percent of all high speed rail projects
were awarded to two SOE contractors: China Railway Group and China Railway
Construction Corp. Executives at two suppliers of high-speed rail equipment said that
until 2011, the MOR used an ―expert review‖ system for choosing contractors.
Brokers, often subsidiaries connected to the Minister, paved the way for contracts.55
These brokers often perform favors for other sources. As a result, every project is
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contracted,

subcontracted

and

subcontracted

again

for

kickbacks.

The

Beijing-Shanghai high-speed railway was initially estimated at US $1.96 billion. In
the end, it cost US $3.4 billion. Cost of the Guangzhou South Station escalated to
RMB 14.8 billion from an initial estimate of a couple billion RMB. 56 A Fujian
Province rail contractor also said that bribes to government officials erase profits.57
Many contractors have to modify their plans over and over. Some even cut back on
material‘s quality in order to profit.58 In many cases workers hired for the subcontract
jobs are cheap and unskilled.59
Literature shows that rent-seeking through abusing administrative power was the
main source of rampant corruption during China‘s transition. In 2000, the Central
Commission on Discipline Inspection (CCDI) of the Party put forward the notion of
―fighting corruption at the roots,‖ demanding a reduction in administrative licensing
and approval. 60 Yet the government lacks oversight because too many illicit
subcontractors emerge through these arrangements. Further privatization of key
industries will create more licensing systems and layers of subsidiaries. Officials and
executives continue to place factional interests or rent-seeking interests over
increasing SOE market profit. These acts of rent-seeking through distributing licenses
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and projects in the infrastructure projects will be further explored in the following
chapters.
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III.

The History of Economic Reform of Telecom State-Owned Enterprises
Telecom had been the classical case of an industry with ―natural monopoly‖

features. The economies of scale theory argued against any potential firms to compete
against the monopoly. Many developing countries have or had state-owned telecom
industries, including China. One representative from the MPT view is that a
state-planned monopoly and central planning could build up basic telecom
infrastructure and raise teledensity rapidly for the population. 61 Current literature
suggests that telecommunications services begin to contribute significantly to overall
economic development when phones are available to 40 or more people per 100. The
developmental vision of the Chinese government hopes to make telecommunications
service available to residents in rural areas and in the less economically developed
regions of central and western China.62 Cross-subsidization between profitable and
unprofitable market segments was regarded as necessary in order to provide universal
service to the public. 63 Irene Wu shows that a higher rate for urban users helps
cross-subsidize for rural usage.64
Still, rent-seeking often occurs in China in the name of development since the
Party devotes enormous amounts of investment for development and modernization.
A closer examination and evaluation of the history of telecom‘s economic path will
61
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help us understand the political logic of the SOE and possibly benefit future ministry
reforms. This chapter will show the consequences of obsolete anti-monopoly laws and
regulations, such as the existence of shadow companies and money laundering in the
form of stock holdings. This chapter will also explain why the state restricted foreign
capital from the telecom industry at first and how foreign capital was introduced
despite the regulations. Many telecom SOEs‘ actions aim to expand power for
inter-jurisdictional power struggles with the State Administration of Radio, Film, and
Television rather than increase profits. As a result, telecom carriers engage in mutually
destructive practices. Finally, the powerful Organization Department‘s role in telecom
restructuring shows how the Party continues to dominate the sector through personnel
appointments.
China's telecom service sector has been one of the fastest-growing industries
since the reform, measured both by the expansion of capacity and growth in revenues.
Yet the telecom service sector remains one of the most closed industries in China, with
the state-owned firms dominating the market through monopolies or duopolies.
Private firms have been banned from providing fixed-line and mobile services. 65
Under Ministry of Post and Telecommunications‘ (MPT) monopoly, telecom services
were both expensive and low quality. Cross-national comparison of the performance
and competition in the telecom service industry indicates that China lagged behind
most transition economies and other large developing countries.66
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One reason for explaining China‘s lag is the role of the MPT as a captive regulator
that suppressed competition. Among ministries under the State Council, the MPT was
the only ministry that combined the functions of policy regulation and public telecom
service provision.67 Japan‘s telecom operator is also owned by the government and
regulated by Japan‘s Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications.68 ―There is
little formal separation between regulatory and political decisions and between the
interests of the government as operator and overseer of the industry.‖69 Like Japan,
China's telecommunication system also has little separation between the operators and
the regulators. MPT‘s growing oversight of industrial development planning and its
monopoly over the public service market conflicted with the interests other ministries.
Dissatisfied with the MPT monopoly, large users and local governments also favored
more liberal policy towards public service.70
Since the 1990s, the government introduced new firms to enter the market by two
means: by issuing a license to a new firm or by restructuring an existing operator into
several parts.71 Competition has brought improved interconnection frameworks, more
services, and cheaper prices. In turn, telecommunication subscribers increased
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rapidly.

72

However, this process has involved much political pressure and

inter-jurisdictional competition.73 While the government knew that competition can
improve efficiency, it also fears diminished revenues from state enterprises due to
competition.74 Certain state actors‘ especially wished to maintain its control of the
telecom sector despite international pressure, namely then-MPT minister Wu
Jichuan.75
Government intervention and interest parties bargaining are pervasive. 76 The
Central Organization Department treated the heads of state telecom companies as
―apparatchiks‖ of the Party. The emergence of China Unicom and other new players in
the industry was a product of high-level politicking. A political coalition formed by
then-Ministry of Electronic Industries, then-Ministry of Electric Power, the Ministry
of Railways, and thirteen major state-owned companies conceived the idea for
Unicom as early as in 1988. 77 The State Council finally awarded China United
Telecommunications Corporation (Unicom) a basic telecom license in 1993. 78
Unicom received much opposition from the former MPT minister Wu Jichuan.79 Wu
welded much power: He regulated the phone system, the cable TV, and the
72
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manufacture of computers and phones.80 The telecom industry moved so fast that Wu
made up new regulations by the week. Wu did not want to lose his power from
regulating Unicom. He attempted to block its market entry or from gaining
competitive advantage.81 Under his lead, the MPT continued to make policy decisions
that favored the Directorate General of Telecommunications, which ran the network.
A similar conflict of interest has occurred between the later government body
Minister of Ministry of Information Industry (MII) and other telecom firms: state
ownership of firms conflicts with the MII‘s interest to promote competition, since it
may reduce state firms‘ state revenues. The MII served as a ―captive regulator,‖ where
it acted in its interest as a major shareholder of the monopoly incumbent China
Telecom during the 1990s. MII regulated the market in ways that favor the incumbent
and impede competition and telecommunications policy legislation remains weak.82
The State Council Informatization Office serves as a weak and small regulator. The
antimonopoly law did not exist until August 2008, which remains relatively
obsolete.83
One example of the obsolete regulations was the rule that prohibited foreign
investment to the telecom industry. In order to introduce foreign investment, Chinese
firms established China-China-Foreign (―CCF‖) structures. A Chinese company was
80
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used as an intermediary between SOEs and the foreign company to circumvent the
rules.84 Former president of the China United Telecommunications (Unicom) Zhao
Weichen first used the structure in 1998 for obtaining Bell Canada investment. 85
Foreign companies would form a joint venture with a Chinese company. That entity,
now a Chinese legal person, would then form a joint venture with a local Unicom
branch. The foreign investor would provide telecom equipment, build the network,
and teach Unicom how to operate it. In return, the foreign entity would collect a share
of the revenue.86 Around twenty-one foreign investors, including Deustche Telekom,
France Telecom, and Sprint, invested around US $1.3 billion in Unicom through their
joint ventures in China.87 Through this method, the MII attracted foreign company‘s
telecom equipment sales to China and raised money for domestic equipment
purchases by maintaining high phone hookup and calling rates.88
But in late 1999, the MII accused the joint ventures of reaping profits at the
expense of government programs designed to subsidize telephone service in poor and
remote regions. 89 Under government pressure, China Unicom unilaterally forced
these investors to withdraw their equities at a very low rate of return of investments.90
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The government resisted ceding profits or management control to foreigners, which
also explains its push toward listing companies on foreign stock exchanges to bring in
foreign capital without foreign management influence. 91 China Telecom, as the
incumbent and former monopoly, particularly wished to maintain its dominance and
stop foreign direct investment that would help its competitors. Unless an
equity-investment-based foreign competition occurred under a full open market,
China Telecom would prefer a growth strategy over a profit strategy to increase its
political status. 92 SOEs‘ political logic constantly prioritizes inter-jurisdictional
power struggle over profit-making.
Since neither telecommunications laws nor anti-corruption laws were in effect,
the option for legal resolution of disputes have not been available. The policy clearly
leaves entrants at the mercy of the incumbent for access and interconnection and puts
the Ministry in charge of determining where and entrant can operate. 93 The first
entries into many markets in China in the past were mostly the result of
intergovernmental competition.94 The first entry into the telecommunications market,
the foundation of Unicom in 1994, was a result of several years of power struggle
between the MPT and a coalition of several government agencies.95
Without procedures for resolving disputes, acts of sabotage, patronage, and
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politicking have been rampant within the telecom industry.96 According to a State
Council think tank, state ownership and control encouraged telecom SOEs to ―expand
investment, seek market power, and increase insiders' income ... these firms have
distorted competitive behavior, such as excess debt and price wars.‖97 Disagreements
between the incumbent monopoly and entrants have led to vicious practices such as
sabotage of rival‘s facilities. For example, Gansu Province‘s Lanzhou Telecom and
Lanzhou Mobile failed to reach an agreement on interconnection in 2000. Lanzhou
Telecom chose to block access of mobile phones to its fixed-line network, resulting
disruptions of communications. On August 2nd, 2000, 260 thousand users of mobile
phones in Lanzhou City were blocked from access to local fixed line network. 98
Lanzhou Mobile subscribers nationwide couldn‘t call through to customers of ―Little
Smart,‖ or xiaolingtong, a personal handy-phone system product. Then people calling
from their home and office phones in Lanzhou could not get through to friends on the
China Mobile system.99 The interconnection was restored on the evening of August
3rd, and this incident made the headlines of People’s Daily.100 Similarly, in Suining
county of Sichuan Province, Unicom‘s communication cable was severed by its rival
carrier in 2002.101 These incidents unsettled then-minister Wu Jichuan who wished to
contain competition. From the Party‘s perspective, if these conflicts happen on a larger
96
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scale, it could lead to mass social discontent or exposed national security. Some Party
members thus use this reason to argue against reforms of SOEs in strategic industries.
Another feature of political control behind private formalities would be frequent
top SOE management changes and state restructuring. The Party‘s Organization
Department decides these changes and implements them within short notice. 102
Concerned that the bosses of the three biggest publicly listed telecom companies
became too powerful, the Organization Department reshuffled the top executives in
2004.103 The third restructuring in the telecom industry in 2008 brought the Zhang
Chunjiang from China Netcom to serve as the deputy general manager of China
Mobile, whose influence will be discussed in the following case study (See Figure
1).104 Overnight, China Mobile had become the world‘s biggest mobile company in a
booming sector. Power was accruing to the companies‘ CEOs in a strategic industry
with important national security implications.105 The Party wishes to control SOEs
but also produce competitive and efficient SOEs.
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Figure 1: 2008 Five to Three Restructuring106

One should not mistake these restructuring with ―mergers.‖ There had been no
discussion of telecom operators making decisions on their own based on commercial
interests nor have any carriers entered or exited the industry without the backing of the
MII and the State Council. 107 Journalist Richard McGregor suggests that the
deliberate element of surprise in many of these moves, much as it might enrage
executives and investors, serves the Party‘s purposes to remind them of their
subordinate status.108 The Party appoints and removes top personnel of ministerial
departments as well as state-owned enterprises through the Organization Department,
despite introducing the corporate governance for telecom firms. The Party strove to
professionalize the selection of top officials, while undermining the process at the
same time by fixing appointments in favor of loyalists and relatives.109
The Party maintains the illusion that it does not involve in resource allocation
decisions. Public announcements of new appointments are made by formal
government bodies, such as the State Council, or the State-Owned Assets Supervision
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and Administration Commission (SASAC), the ministries themselves or the parent
company.110 In 2003, the government created the SASAC as the official shareholder
of the state‘s SOE shares and the government body which regulates SOEs. SASAC
was designated to be the state shareholder of 196 central SOEs. Local SASACs also
would hold the controlling shares of provincial and municipal SOEs.111 On paper,
SASAC is the shareholder. In reality, the Party manages important personnel
appointments and significant policy decisions.112 The reshuffling announcements are
heralded in newspaper headlines as ―job changes.‖ Yet from a party perspective, the
officials who move between enterprises or in and out of the government are being
shuffled within the same system.113
Another example would be over the government‘s halfhearted efforts to run China
Netcom in a more accountable fashion. Then party secretary and general manager of
Netcom, Zhang Chunjiang, recruited John Thornton, the former president of Goldman
Sachs and McKinsey and Company, the management consultancy, to advise him about
how the internal processes should be run.114 Netcom eventually agreed that the board
would approve senior executive appointments. The committee which recommended
the appointments to the board had to have a majority of its members appointed by the
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Party. The board‘s role in evaluating and appointing was strengthened in theory, but in
practice the board only saw candidates authorized and promoted through the party
system. The efforts to open up the company‘s personnel system that lasted for months
ended without much effect.115
The "corporatization" of the state-owned telecom assets and the transition from a
monopoly (a single SOE) to an oligopoly (several SOEs) has not altered the nature of
state control. The Central Organization Department treated the heads of state
companies in China as ―apparatchiks‖ of the Party. The Department shifted them
around despite potential commercial conflicts.116 An anonymous banker suggested,
Richard McGregor argues that ―The idea that the boards really run companies… does
not happen in reality.‖ Major state companies hold Party meetings regularly before the
board meetings. Board meetings discuss operating costs and capital commitments, but
personnel remains in the Party‘s hands. ―No matter how many independent directors
there are and what oversight they provide, at the end of the day, if all management are
appointed by the Party, nothing will change,‖ Richard McGregor concludes.117 The
tension between economic reform and political control in the strategically important
telecom industry continues to trouble the Party.
Pei Minxin also argues that the underlying dominance and exclusive control by
the state over the telecom service sector has hardly changed despite liberalizing
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efforts.118 Entrenched interests have succeeded in protecting their rents. The telecom
sector is an enormous patronage machine and a source of rent generation because it
employs a large number of employees, invests massive capital, and collects monopoly
rents.119 Even the introduction of minority foreign ownership since China‘s WTO
membership could only change in corporate governance on the margins, but could not
lessen state dominance in telecom SOEs. 120 The economic reform history of the
telecom industry will enlighten our understanding of the railway industry, which its
ministry retains the power and monopoly resembling the unitary ministry of MPT. But
before we compare the two, first we shall examine a case study to show the patronage
networks prevalent in the ―reformed‖ telecom industry and the limits of gaizhi.
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IV.

The Case Study of China Mobile’s Value-Added Services
The China Mobile case studies of officials and executives, Zhang Chunjiang, Li

Xiangdong, and Lu Xiangdong, show the extent of rent-seeking in the supposedly
reformed but still state-dominated telecom industry. The telecommunication industry
has more competition than the railway industry, including price wars, but rent-seeking
still exists and centralized state control is rarely absent from market formalities.121
Gradual economic reform without political reform leads to more outlets subject to
rent-seeking.
In 2009, the party‘s anti-graft unit detained the deputy general manager and
Communist Party secretary of China Mobile, Zhang Chunjiang, on unspecified
corruption allegations. Ironically, Zhang was an official who once heralded as a
champion of Chinese-style corporate governance.122 After his court hearings in In
2009, Zhang was arrested by Hebei provincial authorities. A Hebei intermediate
court found Zhang guilty of accepting 7.46 million yuan (US $1.15 million) in bribes
from middlemen Song Shicun and Zhang Rui. 123 Song owned Antong Mobile
Satellite Positioning and Communication Company, founded in 1999 with registered
capital of 10 million yuan. Antong Co. focused on location-based services, and at one
time collaborated with China Unicom and Qualcomm Inc.
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transactions were discovered while Song was seeking to invest in Ultrapower
Software Co., a company whose primary client is China Mobile, at a time when
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Ultrapower was preparing to list on China's Growth Enterprise Markets (GEM)
trading board.125 Zhang Chunjiang‘s other cronies Zhang Rui, Li Xinze, and Tan
Chunling also benefitted from their relationship. These three people‘s patronage
conenctions allowed them to reach into major value-added services (VAS), as well as
consulting, sales representation, and IT services. A two-year long investigation
uprooted many of these networks and shook up China Mobile.126 The average revenue
per China Mobile user, a key industry barometer to determine the long-term growth
rate of telecommunications companies, slid to 71 yuan in 2011 compared with 73 yuan
in 2010.127 This section will use China Mobile as a case study to explain in-depth the
limits to gradual reform.
China Mobile‘s value-added services ―were an essential driver of total revenue
growth,‖ accounting for 31 percent of operating revenue in 2010, the new chairman of
China Mobile Wang Jianzhou said in March 2011.128 The VAS industry only started
less than a decade ago. As the number of mobile subscribers grew rapidly, regulators
and telecom operators also had to expand networks on a massive scale. Paying for this
growth required investment for equipment and service providers. Foreign telecom
equipment manufacturers could find local suppliers eager for contracts. But without
Chinese agents who have close ties to telecom executives and officials to smooth the
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process, foreigners found themselves caught between regulatory constraints.129 Zhang
Rui acted as a middleman and signed up numerous telecom equipment and software
companies who hired him as a consultant. Authorities say he functioned as a
third-party representative by transferring payments from contractors to telecom
company insiders. Zhang called the bribes "consulting fees." His brokering activity
has been common in the industry, especially when foreign companies are involved.130
Zhang Rui also owned a side company that handled computer communication
network technology and project integration, but also sold telecom equipment.131
Monternet, the prospective online platform for distributing innovative
applications, became the corrupt version of Apple‘s App Store under the rent-seeking
influence of another agent-subsidiary relationship. The executive director and
vice-president of China Mobile, Lu Xiangdong, unveiled the Monternet program in
2000, which attracted participation from numerous Internet and software
companies.132 China Mobile launched its multimedia messaging service (MMS) in
2002. The MMS provided another huge opportunity for service providers (SPs) as
well as rent-seekers. Lu and his subordinate Su Jinsheng, then director general of the
Telecommunications Administration Bureau at the MII engaged in graft activity after
this launch. Lu oversaw the Beijing-based carrier‘s development strategy, planning,
construction, and procurement. Lu and Su determined any VAS‘s chance at getting
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listed, as well as its profitability and share price. 133 For a long time, Lu and his
subordinates managed China Mobile‘s value-added services: they set the rules of the
game and initiated the controversial Monternet program. Later, they tried to amend the
rules (for example, they adjusted their profit-sharing plan and prohibited free WAP),
so as to eliminate rampant illegal activities in the multi-billion dollar industry they
created, but to no avail.134
At the end of 2011, Su was sentenced to 13 years in prison by Cangzhou
Intermediate People‘s Court in Hebei Province for accepting nearly 7.12 million yuan
in bribes. The majority of the bribes were for assisting several companies in profiting
from VAS and telecom engineering projects. Companies that bribed him came from
information technology, engineering, and advertising industries. In addition, Su took
200 thousand yuan in exchange for recommending others for promotion. After being
sentenced, he did not appeal his case to a higher authority. The investigation case after
Su‘s downfall showed that he also had connections with providers of VAS.135 Lu
Xiangdong resigned after the judicial investigation of his financial issues in 2012.136
Zhang Rui and Su Jinsheng shared an element in common: the middlemen tried to
steal a slice of pie from the value-added services (VAS). These are often new services,
including SPs, content providers (CP), and wireless data service (WDS). The State
Council issued regulations that allowed Chinese companies other than the monopoly
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to provide VAS, such as paging services and music downloading. In contrast, basic
services in telecom are more controlled. While these definitions evolve along with
changing technologies, current basic services include local and long distance wire line,
and mobile phone rates. 137 The state view believes that markets for plural and
advanced services should be made open for competition gradually.
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government sets tariffs for basic services and places more strategic importance.139
Due to its constantly-updating nature and lesser political importance, value-added
services can obtain licenses from the state for procuring private investment. The
official in charge of this growing sector or well-connected middleman can use these
licenses to rent-seek. For example, Zhang Rui and his wife‘s side companies Beijing
Ruizhi and Raynetwork were valuable for holding a telecom business license. Such a
license requires approvals from multiple government departments and applications are
tightly controlled.140
Investing in advertising companies has been another rent-seeking method for
telecom middlemen. Some shares of these agencies can be half-owned by a telecom
company chief or his family, despite the conflict of interest. 141 Zhang Rui‘s agency
won a national contract from China Netcom in 2004, the year after Zhang Chunjiang
took a job as Netcom's president. Zhang Rui eventually sold the company in 2007 for
7.2 million yuan. Zhang Rui‘s ―career‖ path shows a common theme in the Chinese
137
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telecom industry. His friendship with Zhang Chunjiang and the participation of his
wife are important elements that exemplify the importance of personal networks in
collective rent-seeking (See Figure 2).

Figure 2: Patronage Networks in China Mobile142
Another feature of VAS rent-seeking is its centralization of power and
outsourcing capabilities. The notorious case would be former chief of China Mobile‘s
Digital Music and Data Department general manager Li Xiangdong‘s dealings with
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music VAS. Li Xiangdong studied ringtone technology in Korea in 2003. Then in
2004, he introduced the technology to establish the mobile music base for China
Mobile in Chengdu, capital of Sichuan Province. Sichuan Mobile thus became more
competitive than other music bases and Li Xiangdong used this opportunity to
introduce a Central Platform business plan. Sichuan Mobile‘s Mobile Music Product
Base started officially in August 2006 and revived China‘s dwindling music industry.
It basically functioned as an independent department within China Mobile by the end
of 2009. Even though Li Xiangdong‘s title remained as the manager of Sichuan
Mobile Data Department, he worked mostly on the national wireless music service.143
Interest grew among officials after they witnessed this moneymaking business and
began courting Li Xiangdong.
Initially, big service providers, including China Mobile, provided and managed
their services through their provincial branches. Then China Mobile published the
―Notice on Starting the Concentration of Wireless music Content Management‖ in
June 2009 that required all ringtones and VAS content to be introduced and distributed
by the official 12530.com web portal or the Central Music Platform. Service and
content providers who wanted business on China Mobile's network platform had to go
through the Sichuan Mobile Data Department and Mobile Music Base. 144 China
Mobile intended to concentrate purchase and management to improve efficiency. But
in reality, power and internal resources were increasingly centralized in the hands of
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one man and one bureau, which created the environment for rent-seeking. Li
Xiangdong controlled the music application function for 400 million customers of 31
provinces and municipalities.145 He also gave the Central Music Platform the power
to collect a percentage of profit from direct sales of each province‘s music services,
despite the platform‘s conflict of interest with the provincial mobile companies. On
paper, supposedly, profit allocation differs among service providers and different
companies can negotiate the ratio. In reality, Li‘s approval is crucial because he is the
central agent authorized by the Party. Even though Sichuan Mobile‘s Legal
Department has to approve each contract with the official stamp of the vice manager,
many industry insiders have said that these approvals are merely a formality. 146
Reporter Zhao Hejuan analyzes that despite the competitiveness of the VAS
industry, the competition is geared towards having the best relationship with the
official rather than better products. An anonymous analyst interviewed by Zhao said,
―This kind of business model has the basic characteristic of a monopoly. Any kind of
VAS product has to be issued through its (platform).‖147 Many friends and relatives of
Li Xiangdong benefitted from their relationships. During the decade he served as the
head of Sichuan Mobile Data, his friends established shadow companies in Sichuan as
well as his hometown Jiangsu. For example, one of the initial investors of Chengdu
Yinxin Interactive Info Technology Company, Yu Weizhong, went to university with
Li Xiangdong and shared the same hometown. After the company‘s establishment in
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January 2005, it mainly managed telecom VAS and consulting services and had a long
history of cooperation with China Mobile‘s Data Department. This company started
out with three shareholders but eventually, Yu transferred his shares to someone who
shared the same home address with him.148 With connections to central figure Li
Xiangdong, subsidiary Yu Weizhong could use companies to rent-seek.
In 2001, the Chinese government issued new regulations that put restrictions on
trading in listed shares by Party members and their families. The rules prohibited party
officials in charge of a state-owned company from using their parents, children, or
their children‘s spouse‘s relatives, to trade stocks of a listed state-owned company.149
Yet Zhao Hejuan finds that these acts still occur within the mobile VAS industry. She
thus argues that patronage is present when constant changing in shareholding
possession occurs. ―At first the shares are dispersed among shareholders, but as the
income of VAS increases, the shares are gradually centralized,‖ she writes.150 This
observation also holds true in the case of many privatized industries in China, such as
the railway industry, where the lack of regulatory institutions allows for shadow
companies and money laundering in the form of stock holdings.
China Mobile‘s hierarchical management and ranking system also favored the
companies with patronage connections. According to company policy, the more
research capabilities and higher profit growth a service provider has, the better its
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ranking of reliability.151 The SP could be ranked as ―A,‖ ―B,‖ ―C,‖ or ―normal.‖ This
ranking system in theory would allocate resources toward high-level service providers,
and low-level providers would gradually be eliminated. "But in actuality, the main
deciding factor was the relationship level with Li. Whoever had closer relations would
get more resources and thus move a step closer to reaching a higher grade." explained
Xiang Ligang, a telecom industry veteran.152
A China Mobile internal report last year claimed Li had been manipulating
service providers for personal gain. Government auditors followed up with a visit to
the Sichuan branch in February, and later by meeting with Li. He has since escaped the
country. 153 In the Party‘s deliberate yet spontaneous fashion of human resource
management, positions were quickly replaced through the Organizational Department.
Li Xiangdong‘s case thus provides us with another example of agent-subsidiary
relationship rent-seeking. Case studies of agents Zhang Chunjiang, Li Xiangdong, and
Lu Xiangdong fit the aforementioned theories of collective corruption proposed by
scholars Ting Gong, Lu Xiaobo, Wu Jinglian, and Huang Shaoqing. With an
understanding telecom reforms, one can understand the political logic of rent-seekers
in the following section on the railway industry as well.
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V.

The Case Study of the Ministry of Railway’s High Speed Railway Project
Minister of Railways Liu Zhijun was replaced after the ruling Communist Party

said he was accused of accepting bribes and under investigation for ―severe‖
disciplinary violations, Xinhua News Agency reported February 25 2011. Zhang
Shuguang was also removed as deputy chief engineer and placed under investigation
for alleged ―severe violation of discipline.‖154 The downfall of Liu Zhijun and Zhang
Shuguang cannot be explained without the context of his ambitious high speed railway
project. Liu Zhijun took charge of plans to build 75 hundred miles of high-speed
railway in 2003.155 An earlier reform project died in 2003 with Liu's installment.
Under the leadership of Liu, the Ministry of Railways (MOR) argued in favor of the
monopoly structure because it can maintain efficiency and safety of the rail network
through centralized command and control.156 Centralized command allowed for Liu
and Zhang to act out their entrenched interests in developing the high speed railway
and a spectacular patronage network. Dissenters such as Professor Zhao Jian, of
Beijing Transportation University, publicly objected to the pace of high-speed-rail
construction. He wrote in 2010 that the ―blind pursuit‖ of high-speed rail is ―highly
likely to develop into a debt crisis.‖157 Liu summoned him and advised him to keep
quiet. Even the university president called Zhao to ask him to stop voicing out his
154
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concerns. 158 This chapter will explore problematic outcomes of Liu‘s centralized
power.
Even though Liu and Zhang‘s acts of rent-seeking and quashing dissent had been
circulating in the media outlets, the tragic high speed train accident that happened near
the coastal city Wenzhou, Zhejiang Province on July 23rd, 2011 brought much more
scrutiny to their patronage networks and public spending decisions. The LKD2-T1
signal control system sent a mistaken signal, which was read by the automatic control
system aboard the fast-moving D301 train, which then rammed the slower D3115 train
from behind. 159 The collision killed forty people and injured a hundred and
ninety-two.160 Five months after the accident, authorities released a detailed report
that acknowledged ―serious design flaws,‖ a ―neglect of safety management,‖ and
problems in bidding and testing.161 Gerald Ollivier, a senior infrastructure specialist at
the World Bank in Beijing, argues that trains in China are still by far one of the safest
means of transportation. ―We in the U.S. are doing little to nothing and will pay a price
in slower growth now and in the future,‖ Ollivier said.162 Nicholas Lardy, a senior
fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics in Washington, also
marveled at China‘s large spending on railway networks. He argued that the difference
between China‘s spending and the U.S.‘s spending on networks ―is a confirmation of
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China‘s rise and an indication of U.S. demise.‖163 While economists marvel at the
numbers, one should also look at structural causes for the train accident and rampant
corruption. Problems such as rent-seeking will not improve or self-correct without
regulations. The Chinese government admonished and punished several officials
including Liu and Zhang and slowed down the railway‘s running speed to placate the
public‘s anger and concerns without fundamental reforms. This section will explore
the bidding process to show how rent-seeking has affected the quality of the high
speed railway project.
China has strong reasons for building a high speed railway, such as its vast
geographic landscape, and mobile labor force. China has relied on diesel trains for
much of its freight transport.164 Coal transportation bottlenecks are another reason for
the construction of high speed freight train, because many mines are located in inland
provinces, such as Shanxi Province.165 It is no mere coincidence that Liu Zhijun‘s
major subsidiary, Shanxi businesswoman Ding Shumiao, gained prominence from a
background in the coal business. Rising wages and land costs in the coastal provinces
that underpinned China‘s industrial development for three decades are forcing
manufacturers, including Ford Motor Co., Pfizer Inc. and Foxconn Technology Group,
to move production inland to cut costs. Inland manufacturing strained China‘s ability
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to transport goods within the country.

166

Passenger long-distance ground

transportation is also extremely strained during festival seasons. The official Xinhua
News Agency reported that 83.73 million people traveled by road on a single day
during the 2012 Chinese New Year.167
To meet this high demand, the MOR received much funding for better train
facilities and increased train speed. Like the telecom industry, the MOR also used the
China-China-Foreign (CCF) investment structure and increased number of
contractors outside of the more traditional manufacturers China North Locomotive
and Rolling Stock Industry Corp. (CNR) or China South Locomotive and Rolling
Stock Corp. (CSR). While restrictions against foreign companies from directly
supplying or manufacturing for high speed railway projects did not exist on paper like
the telecom industry, the monopoly interest and underlying restriction was the
same. 168 But the supply side of the economic formula depends solely on the
monopolies and oligopolies of suppliers with good connections. China‘s
central-commanding political system can create the momentum for rapid production
of infrastructure like high-speed railway systems. Yet systemic problems have
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exposed research, bidding, and building process, as well as the post-construction
operation of the trains to corruption.169
As I have argued before, there are very few inconsistent checks and balances on
railway projects approval and railway product quality. 170 The MOR employs 2.5
million people across China and commands a vast budget.171 Commonly referred to as
the tie laoda or ―Boss Rail,‖ the MOR has been a historically strong ministry with its
own police force, courtroom, and procuratorate, as well as a strict hierarchy.172 (The
separate railway courtroom system has been recently abolished.173) While China‘s top
economic planner, the National Department and Reform Committee (NDRC),
nominally approves most of the railway projects, the MOR still overruled much of their
checks. The NDRC had a special offer policy, when the high speed rail met the
nationalization ratio standards, the sales taxes or import custom taxes will have
subsidies and rewards for the Ministry. ―At the time (Railway people) thought, I don‘t
want NDRC rewards and therefore I won‘t need to bear NDRC control,‖ an NDRC
official suggested. Afterwards, the overseeing State Council filed a notice, requiring
the MOR to introduce high speed railway, while the NDRC will ―cooperate‖ with the

169

Qian, Wendy. China’s Corruption-Ridden State Capitalism: An Analysis of China’s High Speed Railway
Industry. 2012.
170
Ibid.
171
Wong, Edward. "China's Railway Minister Loses Post in Corruption Inquiry." The New York Times - Breaking
News, World News & Multimedia. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/13/world/asia/13china.html?_r=0 (accessed
November 24, 2012).
172
Osnos, Evan. "How a High-Speed Rail Disaster Exposed China‘s Corruption : The New Yorker." The New
Yorker. http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2012/10/22/121022fa_fact_osnos#ixzz2DAnITtiy (accessed
November 24, 2012).
Wang, Hongliang. "Liu Zhijun and Liu Zhixiang: The Political Profession and Destiny of the Two Brothers."
Lifeweek.com.cn. http://lifeweek.com.cn/2011-03-14/0005331330.shtml (accessed August 20, 2012).
―The railway is a relatively closed and special system.‖ The reporter said. ―On the train, they have rituals including
wearing uniforms, standing in ordered rows, and salute. When I interviewed the railway system last year I was still
very surprised at these [rituals]. They said ‗we use a partially-militarized kind of management,‘ with the
characteristic of ‗a clear hierarchy between leaders and workers. The orders are absolute, and in a station, the
station chief is absolute authority.‘‖
173

46

process. Afterwards, the State Council also established a technological specialist
committee, while the MOR started a Motor Unit Project United Office, headed by then
Transportation Unit Bureau Chief Zhang Shuguang.174 The power thus shifted to the
MOR, and the NDRC‘s role was thus alienated. In the end, to use words by an NRDC
official, ―(They) didn‘t even let us read and approve plans.‖175 The last official check
on the MOR diminished as central government‘s demand for the high speed railway
grew.176
The centralized power of the MOR laid ground for corruption in an
infrastructure-based industry. Liu Zhijun used the China Railway High-Speed (CRH)
project to achieve high-profile political performance and illicit financial gains.177 A
new, record-breaking high speed railway caters to the people‘s need for national
pride.178 The MOR decides which company receives bids and which factory gains
access to core technology. Before the high speed railway initiative, not many new
manufacturers entered the high speed railway through inside relationships. After high
speed initiatives were introduced, MOR presented a uniform set of standards for all
trains, and gives the bidding power to all the railway bureaus. This railway upgrading
process gave a lot of business opportunities for railway suppliers. Many suppliers
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believe that the uniformity of bidding was good for the standardization of the
railway.179 The state-owned banking system also allocated financial resources that
encouraged the growth-boosting investment in high-speed railways, without
evaluating the consequences of corruption.180
But this call for standardization also increased the power of MOR‘s
Transportation Bureau and fueled patronage. Liu used this momentum and introduced
his crony, a businesswoman Ding Shumiao from Shanxi Province. She backed a club
―for international diplomats,‖ to gain foreign contacts. Her lavish receptions drew
members of the Politburo. Her significance and ability had been well-known in the
industry, and officially acknowledged in August, 2010, when the National Audit
Office reviewed the books of a big state-owned company and came upon a US
$16-million ―commission‖ to Ding, the intermediary, in return for high speed rail
contracts.181 Ding was detained in January, 2011, suspected of taking kickbacks worth
US $67 million.
Ding‘s main company, Broad Union, signed joint ventures and supplied the
ministry with train wheels, sound barriers, and more. In two years, Broad Union‘s
assets grew tenfold, to the equivalent of US $680 million in 2010, according to
China‘s Xinhua news service. 182 Zhibo-Lucchini Railway Equipment Co., Ltd.,
Broad Union‘s joint venture with an Italian company, had no experience in
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manufacturing wheel sets. Yet Zhibo-Lucchini won an important bid for wheel sets,
despite competition from over traditional wheel set companies like Ma Steel.183 Ding
received 800 million yuan as a commission fee for allotting programs among other
manufacturers as well.184 The same problem of back-handled biddings also affects the
quality of cement used for railway tracks. 185 A railcar parts catalog from train
manufacturer CSR lists tax-inclusive prices paid by CSR for more than 3000 parts,
including countertops and toilet paper holders, installed on bullet trains. These prices
far exceed those charged for similar fixtures in China‘s market because prices were set
not by parts companies with high-level connections at the MOR.186
Bidding processes were neither procedural nor organized. In some cases, the
bidding period was shortened from five days to thirteen hours. The bids were
sometimes mere formality, because construction had already begun or a company won
it through a backhand deal.187 A retired member of the Academy of Railway sciences,
Zang Qiji reported that even multinational companies like Siemens would bribe him
and other major scientists to gain advantage for the bidding process.188 Spontaneously
modified bidding requirements in the favor of a patron‘s company are common,
sometimes a day prior to the official bid date. The most dramatic case occurred in
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2010 when the MOR established new bidding conditions for acoustic barrier
industry.

189

Ostensibly the new register capital and construction experience

requirements higher thresholds are intended for better-quality bidders, but actually the
requirements limit the pool down to a specific company. Excluded providers
understand that backhand dealing happened after repeatedly receiving edited fax
notices or internet proclamations about renewed requirements. They express their
collective anger against this practice, but their demands for transparency or fair
bidding are rarely met.190
Shanxi Jinhande Environmental Protection Company, another rent-seeking
company headed by Ding Shumiao, is a notorious case that shows the extent to which
patronage within the bidding process can influence the product quality. Jinhande
mostly coveted the opportunity to manufacture for products along the
Beijing-Shanghai High Speed Railway line. The Beijing-Shanghai railway project
started in April 18th 2008, with a total length of 1318km and 220.9 billion yuan in
investment budget. In 2009, Jinhande combined its bid for the Wuhan-Guangzhou,
Zhengzhou-Xi‘an,

Guangzhou-Shenzhen

sections

that

comprised

the

Beijing-Shanghai high speed railway line with the more authoritative China Railway
Electrification Bureau Group. Even though the bidding was conducted by the Ji‘nan
Engineering Trading Center, a sub-company of Ji‘nan Railway Construction Bureau,
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the real decision power lied in the MOR.191 And the bidding rights went to China
Railway Electrification Bureau Group and Jinhande. An anonymous specialist of the
Railway System believes that some arrangements intended for influencing the bidding
result in Jinhande‘s favor. He analyzes that combining distant three railway
construction projects into one bid was convenient for Jinhande but problematic in
terms of logistics. The specialist said, ―This is very abnormal, because the railway
construction transportation costs should was a very important factor, and these three
lines are very far apart, which would not only increase transportation cost, but also
increase the management difficulty during the construction.‖ 192 Jinhande benefits
from bidding arrangements despite logistical impracticalities. Given that Jinhande is a
relatively small company, how does it manage to produce and install acoustic barriers
for so many lines?
Companies that could win the large bid later became illicit brokers when the bid
exceeded their production capacity. For example, even though Jinhande won all the
bids by its connections and technology, it cannot produce all the orders. So Jinhande
would then divide the work amongst other companies, while also pocketing brokerage
―management fees‖ from them.193 The middleman cuts usually 3 percent to 8 percent
of the entire deal for ―management fee;‖ other reports indicate 1 to 6 percent.194
During the bidding process of the Beijing-Shanghai high speed railway line‘s acoustic
barriers, the ―conquer and divide‖ phenomenon also occurred. For example, a Jiangsu
191
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corporation‘s product had the label of a Chengdu company. But the contract was
signed by a Xuzhou company. Investigations revealed that the Chengdu company that
assigned some orders to Xuzhou company, which then transferred it to the Jiangsu
company.195
Other contracted firms benefit from being direct subsidiaries of the MOR. The
signaling system that caused the tragic Wenzhou train accident was developed and
assembled by Beijing-based, state-run China Railway Signal and Communication
(CRSC).196 It receives government funding and designs, researches, manufactures,
and sells its products within the railway system.197 One of its foreign partnerships is
Nasdaq-listed Hollysys Automation Technologies Ltd. Hollysys is one of the three
companies MOR had approved to do such work. Like Zhibo-Lucchini, Hollysys was
relatively new to the industry.198 Hollysys became a central supplier of the signaling
systems, circuits and software and received more than US $100 million in high-speed
rail signaling contracts in 2010. 199 State Council conducted an ex post facto
investigation on the train crash, but many railway and subway lines continue to
operate on Hollysys signal equipment.200 Despite the crash and pressure to improve
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its systems, investors in CRSC remain confident that the company will continue to
dominate the market and will continue to win MOR contracts. 201 In a more
competitive environment, Hollysys would have suffered from its ignominy.
Head of Transportation Zhang Shuguang‘s wife, Wang Xing, chose a safer path
for infrastructure rent-seeking. Zhang obtained real power and enjoyed power to
delegate resources after transferring to the Passenger-car Subdivision in 1994 by way
of connections.202 Many spending choices were ―all up to a nod of his head,‖ Zang
Qiji, a retired member of the Academy of Railway Sciences said.203 Wang Xing thus
benefitted from Zhang‘s rise to power. Since the end of the 1990s, Wang represented
major foreign toilet suppliers such as Micropher Rail Corp. to Monogram.204 Railway
toilet supplies include the entire set of materials of collecting human waste in the
bathrooms. Compared to other construction materials, toilet infrastructure comprises a
relatively small part of the high speed railway industry. Still, there was an annual need
for 30 thousand set of toilet equipment, which exceeded 1 billion yuan in market
size.205 According to an insider in mechanics production, this sector does not involve
safety issues but it has a huge market, and its low-key status works in the favor of
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Wang‘s delicate position as the wife of Zhang Shuguang.206 ―Even though the MOR
would send invitations to foreign companies, but eventually Micropher and
Monogram would win the bidding at the same time, and take up the largest share of the
market," an anonymous toilet salesperson said.207 Her role is similar to that of VAS
telecom middleman Zhang Rui. Both Wang Xing and Zhang Rui facilitated the entries
of foreign companies, but only those that curried their favor. They both engaged in
malpractice that decided market outcomes.
There are also many similarities between trend of power centralization and bid
outsourcing in the railway and the telecom industry. The central government calls for
uniform management, which at first seems efficient and necessary. But then the person
with the decision-making power gives the large share to his friend and relatives. His
friend‘s companies then outsource the orders to other companies while they launder
the money to their own pockets, sometimes overseas.208 Zhang Shuguang has been a
notorious case of a naked official, or luo guan. He bought a US $840,000 house in the
Walnut, California in 2003 when he was reportedly earning just US $365 a month.209
Worse, other companies and subsidiaries do not have a sufficient check on quality
problems. Regardless of the quality, the high speed railway system was growing so
fast that almost everything a supplier produced found a buyer. 210 A similarly
excessive need for speedy expansion also occurred in the telecom industry, though
206
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with fewer deadly consequences.
The depressing story of infrastructure rent-seeking does not end when the
government crack downs on corruption. The complicated aftermath of corruption
investigations especially affects the railway industry, which has long-term
construction projects with few insurance policies. Since Liu Zhijun and Zhang
Shuguang‘s downfall, the government ordered to stop several of these orders or even
reverse infrastructure installations. Some products, including wind barriers, were
scheduled to be installed on the Beijing-Shanghai high speed railway. After a fax sent
by the central government to companies on March 2nd, 2011, titled ―About the (Wind)
Barriers Processing Installment Notice,‖ some of the 1.93 meter wind barriers have
been cancelled. The order indicated that the installed barriers must be taken down, and
the ones that are not installed will not be supplied. A day after the fax, many of the
wind boards have been taken down in Tianjin City‘s Wuqing District, with only
vertical bars standing agape. No one knows who will pay for the costs of taking down
the wind barriers.211
Not only does the lack of checks and balances on the MOR affect the
infrastructure quality and effective governance, the project‘s financial health also
suffers. None of the investment capital of the high speed railway comes from private
sources.212 The financing of the high speed railway project relies heavily on loans
from central banks. The tax system and difficulty of market entry also lessens the
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possibility for competition. 213 Due to the lack of checks and balances, the ticket
pricing system has been targeted by corrupt officials as well since its implementation
in 1995. 214 MOR officials, including former Minister Liu Zhijun‘s brother Liu
Zhixiang, the head of the railways bureau in the city of Wuhan, profiteered by
manipulating ticket prices.215 Large numbers of tickets end up in the hands of scalpers
and ticket prices increased exponentially during times of high demand, such as the
holidays. 216 Government investigators found that Liu Zhixiang accumulated the
equivalent of US $50 million in cash, real estate, jewelry, and art.217 In April, 2006, a
court in Hubei Province gave Liu Zhixiang a suspended death sentence for hiring
people to kill a man who had revealed his corrupt activities. Liu Zhixiang was also
convicted of taking bribes and embezzling public funds and property worth more than
US $5 million over a nine-year period. 218 The MOR implemented reforms and
improved financial accountability for the passenger railway ticketing.

219

Yet

customers remain deeply unsatisfied and published many rants about the ticketing
system in September 2012.220 Also, the freight delivery remains as a loophole for
railway officials‘ price manipulation.221
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The MOR‘s unchecked power also actively thwarted the scientific research
progress in the subordinate factories. Many Chinese scientists in the Academy of
Railway Science hoped to research and develop their own high speed train model.222
High speed train model ―Star of China‖ came very close but could not win bidding
rights.223 Liu Zhijun earned a bad reputation among domestic suppliers and scientists
alike for his impatient political ambition. Some called him ―Great Leap Liu,‖ in an
allusion to Mao Zedong‘s disastrous Great Leap Forward.224 Liu Zhijun ignored and
even punished dissent from the science experts.225 The MOR insisted on importing
technology for the assuring ―foreign‖ name, which would guarantee quality from the
public‘s view. Some people criticized Liu in online forums for impatiently buying
Japanese products when he knew that Chinese models could have been developed
over a longer period of time. Some commentators called Liu a ―traitor,‖ and labeled
the high speed trains as ―Shame‖ in place of the given name ―Harmony‖ (Hexie
Hao).226
Finally, rent-seeking has exacerbated the already debt-heavy financing of high
speed railway. When the first high speed line débuted with a test run in June, 2008, the
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project exceeded over the budget by 75 percent.227 The amount of its outstanding
bond debts by the end of October 2012 was 622 billion yuan. The ministry's overall
liabilities are estimated at over 2 trillion yuan. 228 The MOR‘s liabilities were
equivalent to US $198 billion at the end of 2009, with 38 percent of debt-to-asset
ratio.229 The ministry's plan was to have revenue-generating operations come on line
before loans come due in 2011. Yet lenders turned soft toward the ministry after Liu's
sacking in February, and big banks are no longer offering discounted rates, narrowing
the ministry's ability to raise funds.230 Zhang Chunjiang managed to revive Netcom
from indebtedness during his time as a general manager, but in order for that type of
restructuring, the railway industry would still require a centralized management
system. Through bad debts in state-controlled banking systems, Party officials can
conceal the information from the public and thus hide their slush funds costs of
gradualist reforms of industries.231
The aftermath of the accident shows the limits on media‘s checks on the MOR.
The Department of Propaganda ordered editors to give the crash as little attention as
possible. ―Do not question, do not elaborate,‖ it warned, on an internal notice. When
newspapers came out the next morning, China‘s first high-speed train wreck was not
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on the front page.232 A day after the accident, the MOR dug a pit and buried the
railcars, attempting to destroy evidence. Lawyers in the Zhejiang Province area say
that the government-run bar association ordered them not to take on crash cases.233
The media‘s coverage on the first anniversary of the Wenzhou accident was also
tightly managed. China‘s state press was ordered not to visit the scene, and survivors
were warned to not speak to media outlets. When a man tried to visit the site that day,
he was tailed and videotaped by police.234
In conclusion, Liu Zhijun and Zhang Shuguang‘s centralized power allowed for
them to protect and benefit from rent-seeking their subsidiaries, such as Wang Xing,
Liu Zhixiang, and Ding Shumiao. The railway‘s ticketing, acoustic barrier, wind
barrier, and toilet industry have all been entrenched with rent-seeking interests. The
science research process has also compromised with central figures‘ ambition to finish
the high speed railway project. While the existence of high speed transportation will
benefit many rural and urban economies, this centralized system has impinged the
quality of railway products and customer service. While the government wishes to
improve the railway system through economic reform, the lack of checks and balances
is crucial factor for the thriving patronage network. Even though the Liu brothers (Liu
Zhijun and Liu Zhixiang), Ding, and Zhang have been punished, the story of
infrastructure rent-seeking does not end with the seasonal, irregular, and
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politically-charged anti-corruption campaigns. Despite its bad debt, more state
investment will flow into the railway industry in the next decade. Collective
rent-seeking will continue without more media independence or effective legal
institutions.
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VI.

Comparing Rent-Seeking and Reform in the Telecom and Railway
Industry
Both telecommunications and railways are fundamental public infrastructure that

speeds economic growth. They receive much attention from the Party for their
strategic importance as well. Yet ready investment and unchecked powers of central
decision-makers such as Liu Zhijun and Zhang Chunjiang has led to rent-seeking
through agent-subsidiary relationships in both industries. While telecom has
decreased the power of its ministry, none of these two industries have succeeded in
separating the roles of policy-making and service delivery. The MOR is more
integrated and thus more vulnerable to rent-seeking as well as quality issues.
From railway signal systems to toilets to VAS products, these products produced
by SOEs or Ministry-affiliates are all subject to quality issues. Given the spectacle of
the train crash, the consequences of quality issues caused by rent-seeking are
obviously more disastrous for the public psyche. But the reasons for rent-seeking and
bad infrastructure quality are similar in nature. The political protection offered by the
central agent, such as Liu Zhijun or Zhang Chunjiang, for the subsidiaries allow them
to lax on product quality checks. While the agent-subsidiary relationship is an efficient
rent-seeking model that allows room for economic growth, too many illicit
subsidiaries decrease the possibility for state supervision.
Another shared aspect of telecom and railway subsidiaries lies in their response to
state inspection and the downfall of their central agent. After some major figure in the
industry is investigated, the ―friends‖ leave the country to escape investigation. Much

61

of Zhang Shuguang‘s assets already were transferred abroad, anticipating state
inspection. There have been three bosses of railway toilet supplying companies who
have been investigated, and others have been staying outside China for months.235
Similarly, those who benefited from their links with Zhang Chunjiang and Zhang Rui
also escaped to foreign countries during corruption investigations.236 For example,
equipment suppliers for Sichuan Mobile left China temporarily after Sichuan Mobile‘s
executive manager Li Hua was investigated.237 After investigating China Mobile in
2010, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) of the Party sent
investigation teams each to China Mobile, China Unicom and China Telecom in 2011.
This anti-corruption campaign targeted middle-level managerial staff and above. In
order to prevent another escapade, authorities ordered these executives to turn in their
passports temporarily. 238 Manufacturing corporations that had received fat orders
through Zhang Shuguang‘s patronage network faced a double challenge: on the one
hand they received no money and thus suffer from a broken capital chain, and on the
other hand they are investigated for their dealings with Zhang Shuguang.
Without better anti-monopoly laws, public disclosure of accounts, external
auditing, and independent media, anti-corruption campaigns in the telecom and
railway industry cannot stop corruption. ―They made a show of [crackdowns,] but it‘s
still the same rules,‖ an anonymous subcontractor for the railway said. ―They caught

235

Wang, Chen. "Jinghu Gaotie Pingzhang Fengbo: Gongcheng Zongtouzi You 23 Yi Fanzhi 52 Yi." Sohu News.
http://business.sohu.com/20110425/n280406671.shtml (accessed November 23, 2012).
236
Zhao, Hejuan. Tian Xia You Zei: The Invisible Thief. Guangzhou: Nanfang Ribao, 2012.
237
Ibid.
238
Yongqiang, Gu, and Cao Haili. "All the Wrong Signals for China's Fast Trains." Caixin Online News and
Analysis on China's Markets, Chinese Businesses and Economics.
http://english.caixin.com/2011-09-01/100297517.html (accessed November 24, 2012).

62

Ding Shumiao, but she‘s just one person. There are many, many Ding Shumiaos.‖239
There will also be many Zhang Ruis and Wang Xings. Corrupt officials would be
replaced with new officials tempted by the same rent-seeking opportunity. In fact, the
secret informers that reported Liu Zhijun and Zhang Chunjiang‘s acts to the Party
most likely had ulterior motives. They wish to replace the position with another agent
that would choose them as the subsidiary for rent-seeking and become agents
themselves. Informers are motivated out of self-interest rather than creating a better
system. The timing of then-China Mobile deputy general manager Zhang Chunjiang
and then-Minister of Railways Liu Zhijun‘s downfall also anticipate the 18th Party
Congress‘s power reshuffle. While much of the explanations for crucial position
changes are speculative, people expect dramatic changes in high leadership before
Party congresses. Hence the downfalls of Liu Zhijun and Zhang Chunjiang are shifts
in factional power rather than a signal for institutional reform.
The future for railway reform does not look promising. Scholar John Ure once
observed that there are conservative and reformist elements in all organizations, such
as China‘s Ministries and SOEs. Without a strong external challenge, such as
―competition from a new entrant, or a strong political directive from the State Council
level,‖ the nature of China‘s Ministry-based bureaucracy ―is to prolong decision
making the name of ‗consensus‘ or simply to put things on indefinite hold,‖ Ure
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wrote.240 He based his observations on the telecom industry that changed over time in
response to technological innovations.
Even with an external challenge of the Wenzhou train crash, the MOR decidedly
tabled a reform plan. According to a 1991 law, the MOR directly administers and is
financially responsible for railway service delivery units, the eighteen regional rail
authorities (RRAs).241 A reform plan suggested for allowing expanded autonomy for
MOR regional bureaus, in terms of operational management and finances in 2011.
Regional divisions such as the Shanghai Railway Bureau and Beijing Railway Bureau
would function in some ways as independent market players. It was shelved suddenly
after the Wenzhou accident that triggered a nationwide debate over the wisdom of a
high speed train program. 242 Thus, the World Bank consultants‘ roadmap for the
MOR‘s reform (see Figure 3), while plausible, could be easily tabled as well.

Figure 3: The Three Pillars for Reform243
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Can the MOR and railway industry learn from the path of telecom SOE reform?
The cautionary tale of the telecom industry shows that even with multiple providers,
destructive sabotage activities, rent-seeking and incidents of unreliable service could
still occur. One could easily imagine a rival railway regional bureau refusing to
transport customers from another regional bureau in times of price wars. Furthermore,
Wu Jichuan backed the telecom monopoly for an extensive period of time. Like Wu
Jichuan‘s attempt to hold onto control and thwart competition, Liu Zhijun‘s influence
also remains in the MOR. Zang Qiji recalled that many administrative people are
obstructive to his requests since Liu‘s downfall. He believes that they are retaliating
for Liu‘s downfall through informal resistance.244 Moves to open the MOR for private
investments will require more changes to the bureaucracy than just removing leaders.
Suggestions for railway reforms will require further research. We should
acknowledge the differences qualities between the industries before providing
suggestions. The railway industry has never been as competitive as the telecom
industry. The telecom industry has been challenged many times through technological
innovation and popular bottom-up products. The nature of telecom technology
provides an opening for unauthorized competitors. As Irene Wu summarizes, the
emergence of new technologies can destabilize industry structure (See Figure 4). If
technology challenges the established balance of power among ministries,
government power will slow down innovation.245 In the case of high speed railway,
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this graph does not apply because its industry characteristics differ from that of
telecom. While people can invent bottom-up solutions for communicating with one
another, building a railway system requires much capital and resources that few
people could provide on their own.

Figure 4: China‘s approach to new Telecom Technology: Challenge, defense, and
retrenchment246
Unlike the railway, telecom VAS is a non-rivalrous good, in which the marginal
increase of the next person using it will not diminish the resource. Yet in China, given
the enormous number of people and resources using the rivalrous good of railway
transportation, MOR will require more top-down management, especially because it
will have to respond in an orderly manner in times of crises. If China‘s railways
246
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actually consisted of five regional companies of roughly equal traffic task, each one
would still appear on a list of the ten busiest railway companies in the world.247 The
MOR can still play a central role in regulating logistics and qualifications for
personnel. But then one would ask: what if the MOR still uses its limited role to
rent-seek again, as in the telecom case? Telecom officials still gave exclusive licenses
to people they personally knew or curried favor to them. The MOR could also give out
licenses to well-connected railway companies. In order to prevent further rent-seeking
after the MOR increases competition, the Party will need more independent
institutions to check and audit SOEs.
This thesis chapter compared the similarities and differences between the telecom
and railway state-dominated industries and subsidiaries similar reactions to
rent-seeking. The next thesis chapter will discuss the general prospects of SOE reform
in the context of rent-seeking.
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VII.

The Future for State-Owned Enterprise Reforms
The government acknowledges the imperative for eradicating corruption but has

had little success. The CCDI issues directives for fighting corruption from its
plenary meeting last January 12, 2010. It stressed requirement for party organs at all
levels to monitor officials' family asset declaration and the supervision of executives
who are running SOEs. The CCDI has made specific regulations to prohibit
government officials from, for example, banqueting and sightseeing at public
expense, offering or accepting securities as gifts, building private housing with
public funds, engaging in business activities, borrowing public money, and using
public vehicles for private purposes. 248 The CCDI also encouraged public
participation in lodging complaints about corruption via the Internet, though the
incentive programs for reporting on corrupt officials remain unclear.249 The person
who risked his marriage to report on Liu Zhixiang had to appeal several times to
receive his official compensation of 50 thousand yuan. 250 While rules and
regulations against corruption have increased in recent years, they have not been
effective. Statistics show that the Party has grown softer on corruption in its
punishments. While the Chinese government has expanded considerably over the last
decade, the number of officials indicted for various economic crimes number has held
relatively steady since 2000. This trend indicates a relative decrease in the real rate of
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prosecution. 251 Party members ―vows to work harder‖ after every anti-corruption
campaign, yet the anti-corruption system does not change and continues to allow top
officials to supervise themselves.252
Reform of SOEs will be a hard and costly process because gradual economic
reform is dictated by its political logic. The World Bank published the ―China 2030:
Building a Modern, Harmonious, and Creative High-Income Society,‖ a joint report
with the Development Research Center of China‘s State Council. The report suggested
that for natural monopolies, the monopolist enterprise should be subject to
independent and strict oversight to ensure that the lack of competition does not lead to
monopoly pricing and the abuse of market power that could harm downstream
industries.253 The participation of Chinese government bodies in this report lends it
more credibility than other policy recommendations.
Yet China‘s ruling elites‘ political survival can be threatened by World Bank
reforms. Pei Minxin estimates that substantial reforms recommended by the ―China
2030‖ study could threaten five million Party jobs at SOEs and an equal number at
government agencies that depend on strong state control of the economy. ―World
Bank-style reforms would jeopardize probably close to ten million official sinecures,‖
Pei writes. ―There is little doubt that reducing the SOEs‘ power would make the
Chinese economy far more efficient and dynamic. But it is hard to imagine that a
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one-party regime would be willing to destroy its political base.‖254 Economic assets
serve the political function of retaining patrons within the Party, yet this ―loyalty‖ does
not come cheaply. Furthermore, SOE privatization would increase layoffs. In 1995,
SOE reforms caused officials to fire between 30 million and 40 million workers.255
With increases in social protests and stability maintenance budgets every year, the
Chinese government will not want to increase social unrest by increasing
unemployment. The new head of CCDI, Wang Qishan, has an extensive background
in finance. Given his knowledge, he may learn the ways corrupt officials try to
rent-seek and funnel money out of the country quickly. But potential reform efforts by
the Party will most likely be thwarted by entrenched SOE interests, linked together by
the rent-seeking groups, such as the ones examined in this thesis.
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VIII. Conclusion
This thesis has shown the limits of economic privatization without political
reform in China. Chapter I summarized previous literature on collective rent-seeking
and agent-subsidiary and applied these concepts to SOEs. Chapter II illustrated the
government‘s dilemma between strategic interests and self-preservation through
maintaining state control, versus increasing SOE competitiveness through
privatization. Chapter III explained the political logic of SOEs by examining the
history of telecom reform. Then-minister Wu Jichuan wished to dominate the
industry and backed the monopoly for an extensive period of time. Chapter IV and V
revealed state-dominated industries‘ potential for agent-subsidiary rent-seeking with
case studies of China Mobile and the MOR. Chapter VI compared the railway and
telecom rent-seeking cases and asked whether or not the MOR could learn from the
experience from the MII‘s reform. Many risks lie ahead for the gradual reform of the
railway industry, which the Party intends to implement in the near future. Chapter
VII analyzed the future for general SOE reforms and corruption and suggested some
difficulties the ―fifth-generation‖ Party leadership will face.
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